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The Law, Politics, and Economics
of Amazonian Deforestation
EMILIo F. MORAN"
The ineffectiveness of laws alone to protect the environment is nowhere
as evident as in the contemporary destruction of the Amazonian rain and
moist forests. Since 1975 the rate of deforestation has steadily accelerated
with a four-fold increase to 125,000 square kilometers by 1980 and twenty-
fold to 600,000 square kilometers by 1988.' The peak was reached in 1987
when up to 8 million hectares of forest were burned.2 There is reason to
be concerned with this scale of destruction. Not only does forest cutting
and burning release earth-warming gases, but the diversity of the earth's
species may be destroyed. The Amazon contains 26.5 percent of the
planet's moist forests, estimated to contain 50 percent of all the world's
species.'
The blame for deforestation has been assigned to very different actors.
A number of analysts and government officials have been quick to blame
the poor, small-scale farmers for most of the deforestation.4 In the
Brazilian Amazon, and most of Latin America, the bulk of the deforestation
is a result of fiscal incentives and tax holidays given to cattle ranches.'
Recent studies have increasingly blamed traditional elites for the bulk of
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deforestation. The average size of a cattle ranch is 24,000 hectares, some
of them are as large as 560,000 hectares, and they cover an area at least 8.4
million hectares in the Brazilian Amazon alone.6 Owners of properties at
such scale have their own hired gunmen to threaten any effort by the
landless to occupy any portion of their large properties. According to
Brazilian law, citizens have usufruct rights to land that is not being
cultivated after one year, and if they are able to maintain habitual use of the
land for five years, they have a right to have it legally titled in their name.7
Given the very large size of these properties, and the often non-productive
nature of economic activity of these properties, it is not uncommon for the
landless to move into what appears to be available land. In many cases the
occupants are not aware of who has a right to the land, given the absence
of property boundaries. In other cases, it may be an invasion which
challenges the right of some landowner to vast unused land. When violence
is committed by the hired guns, it is difficult if not impossible to charge the
owner, and even those carrying out the burning of the homes and at times
even the murder of the squatters.
Even after the tax holidays and fiscal incentives were formally
withdrawn in 1985, a result of international pressure on Brazil, bankers and
other credit providers still favored cattle ranchers over small-scale farmers.
The bulk of the subsidized credit in Brazil still goes to large-scale
properties. Much of the credit is spent on clearing the maximum area of
forest affordable, rather than investing in careful management of the
property. This accounted for the bulk of deforestation in the 1980s. The
peak of forest burning took place two years after the fiscal incentives and
tax holidays were presumably cancelled.' Cattle ranching is seen as a good
hedge in a hyperinflationary economy such as that of Brazil.9 In 1993, this
inflation is expected to surpass 1,400 percent. The forest, a public good, is
converted into a marketable good once it is deforested. There has been little
effort made to give value, economic or otherwise, to the native forests. The
only way that a forested area has economic value in contemporary Brazil is
when the forest is removed. This lack of economic value exposes them to
6. MAHAR, supra note 1, at 15.
7. Hans P. Binswanger, Brazilian Policies that Encourage Deforestation in the Amazon, 19
WORLD DEV. 821, 823 (1991).
8. Booth, supra note 2, at 1428.
9. Susanna B. Hecht, The Logic of Livestock and Deforestation in Amazonia, 43 BIOSCIENCE
687, 689-92 (1993).
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predatory use. Cattle ranches, on the whole, are not economic enterprises
unless they capture favorable loans or fiscal incentives.' ° They support
few head of cattle and the price of beef in Brazil has not declined despite
the addition of millions of hectares of pasture to the landscape of Brazil.
The only way to benefit from forest-to-pasture conversion is to keep selling
the land, each time more deforested than before. Because the twenty-five
percent capital gains tax on land sales is rarely collected, there is a strong
incentive to engage in this sort of speculative land turnover given the large
size of individual properties, and the increase in value that occurs with
deforestation.l"
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT
The Brazilian Constitution guarantees all its citizens a healthy and stable
environment. 2  However, the federal government is limited by the
Constitution to formulating only general norms, delegating to the states and
counties the specification of those norms. 3 It is only with the new
Constitution of 1988 that the federal government "obligates" states and
counties to carry out environmental impact assessment as a tool of
environmental monitoring. However, fertilizer companies have fought
efforts made by the legislatures of the southernmost states of Brazil to
control the use of fertilizers in their respective regions as
"unconstitutional."' 4 Few states have implemented specific enough
environmental policies to be workable. Because the bulk of the state and
municipal taxes are not collected and used locally, but go to the federal
coffers first, and then a small proportion is returned to state and local
government, little incentive has been put into effective tax policies that
benefit the local environment.
Legally, the authority to monitor the forest cover of the country falls
into the hands of states and counties, institutions usually with low technical
capability to undertake such monitoring-and perhaps more importantly,
10. Susanna Hecht et al., The Economics of Cattle Ranching in Eastern Amazonia, 13
INTERCIENCIA 233-40 (1988).
11. Id.
12. CONSTITUIPAO DA REPOBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL; DiRErro AMBIENTAL E A QUESTAO
AMAZ6NICA 4 (Maria C. Dourado ed., 1991).
13. Id. at 10.
14. See generally id.
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with no tradition of opposing powerful economic interests. In reality, the
monitoring of forest cover is provided by the National Institute for Space
Research (INPE), which is the receiving station for the United States
LANDSAT satellite, the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) weather satellites and Le Systeme Pour
L'Observation de la Terre (SPOT) French satellite data for South America.
INPE, like most other notable research institutions in Brazil, is federally-
funded. Brazil has been, for most of its history, a highly centralized,
patrimonial, presidential system.15 Congress has been an ineffective and
often incompetent organ-all too willing to turn its authority over to the
executive, in exchange for federal largess in state and local level projects.
Political parties change names rapidly and voters do not vote for a party
with a consistent ideology but for strong personalities (who shift political
parties at will).6 Efforts to change this system during the last
Constitutional Convention failed due to the effective threats of then
Brazilian President Jos6 Sarney (1984-89) to withhold federal funds from
those failing to support a five-year term, and the inflationary largess of his
government towards those who voted to maintain a strong presidential,
rather than parliamentary, system. More recent effcrts in 1993 to have a
popular plebiscite to choose between presidentialism, parliamentarism, and
monarchy, following the removal of President Fernando Collor de Mello
(1989-92) on corruption charges resulted in a victory for presidentialism.
Given this highly personalistic political reality, and its political
economic alliance with powerful elites, it has been difficult to enforce
legislation which is not favored by those same interests. Any agent of the
state trying to enforce environmental legislation which is not supported by
a powerful local patron stands to be warned first to not report the violation,
or experience personal violence (i.e. murder). Representatives of
environmental protection agencies stand to experience the same mortal
violence that Chico Mendes and other activists in rural Brazil have
experienced.
15. See generally FERNANDO URICOECHEA, THE PATRIMONIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE BRAZILIAN
BUREAUCRATIC STATE (1980).
16. R. FAORO, Os DONOS DO PODER: FORMA(,O DO PATRONATO POLITICO BRASILIERO (1958);
VICTOR NUNES LEAL, CORONELISMO, ENXADA E VOTO 147-49 (1949).
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Under Article 26 of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, 7 destruction of
the Amazonian and the Atlantic forests became a crime under the penal
code.' 8 This new constitutional provision has been rarely enforced and is
based upon similar codes in France where it has been applied more
succesfully. Other general norms have been passed that provide protection
to the fauna, the soil, the air, the water, the fisheries, and natural resources.
The states have their own constitutions, derived from the federal one, which
have attempted to elaborate on their obligations towards environmental
protection. While well meaning, only one of the states made any effort to
specify how they would create a fund to pay for the cost of protecting their
environment.' 9 Without such practical steps, and given the precarious
nature of most states' budgets, it is unlikely that enforcement by state or
municipal authorities will occur. This failure to take into account the
budgetary consequences of legislation or constitutional law has been a
persistent problem in Latin American history which accounts for the
mismatch between the intentions of the law and its implementation.
Other important obstacles to the protection of the environment in Brazil
derive from archaic notions of the rights of owners of private property.
Intervention of public authorities in what goes on inside a legally titled
property is opposed by the elites who control very large properties, and by
others who aspire to someday have them. Even though the Constitution
links the right to private property to its "social function," this linkage has
remained vague in legal terms and unapplied to destruction of vast areas
within the private domain of individuals or corporations.
This situation has begun to change. A couple of political parties have
emerged with strong political philosophies which may outlive their current
leaders. If so, they may begin to formulate a clear environmental policy that
can break the gridlock and sectoral confusion currently present. These same
parties seem to be motivated by a grass-roots ideology seeking to involve
the public in political economic decisions through mobilization and
education. In so far as they incorporate environmental education as part of
their overall plan to politically educate the public, progress can be foreseen
in the coming generation. The Workers' Party and the Green Party have
acted as a coalition in municipal elections and have been moderately
17. CONSTITUI(AO DA REPUBLICA FEDERATIVA Do BRASIL art. 26 (Brazil).
18. See generally DIuITO AMBIENTAL E A QUEsTAo AMAZONICA, supra note 12.
19. Id.
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successful on that level in linking environmental and social policy. The
alliance has not been as successful at the national level where the
environment has always taken second place to social and economic
priorities.
One feature of recent environmental legislation which does not seem to
have made its way into Brazilian Law, or at least into its implementation,
is the now common notion in Canada, and increasingly in the U.S., that
those who destroy or pollute the environment will be charged for the costs
of restoring and/or cleaning it. This is an important principle which was not
part of earlier cost/benefit analyses, and which reduces the likelihood that
nonusers of a product, and the public at large be charged for the costs of
resource destruction. This principle has been effectively implemented in
restoring landscapes after strip mining, after clear-cutting forests, and other
forms of previously publicly financed restoration in a number of countries.
These costs are now included in the price of doing business and are passed
on to consumers of that product-forcing them to rethink the resource they
wish to use.
In the Brazilian Amazon this kind of principle is simply not applied.
Gold miners and other mining concerns dig deep holes all over the basin in
search of minerals, and leave a devastated terrain favorable to the spread of
malaria. Malaria, which had been brought under control in the late 1950s,
is now out of control in Brazil largely as a result of the activities of miners
and the failure of any government entity to enforce the restoration of the
landscape to its previous condition--despite the wealth that some actors are
obtaining from these activities.
The same can be said for the currently devastating conversion of forest
to charcoal in order to fire pig iron smelters in the eastern Amazon. The
clear cutting of native forests was presumed in the legislation that approved
the development of the pig iron smelters would be followed by reforestation,
but policing and enforcement of this legal requirement has been lax--even
though reforestation is financed by public funds from the federal
government. In other words, like the earlier subsidies to cattle ranches,
current subsidies for iron development is providing an income transfer from
the average Brazilian taxpayer to the large owners of land producing
402 [Vol. 1: 397
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charcoal, leaving in its wake not a reforested and sustainable landscape but
a degraded one.2"
II. THE ISSUE OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
One of the most complex wrinkles in the landscape of international
environmental protection is the one presented by the concern with national
sovereignty felt by a number of countries. Brazil is particularly sensitive to
this issue. To understand this hypersensitivity it is necessary to recall how
Brazil expanded from its Northeastern hump, given to Portugal in 1493
through the Treaty of Tordesillas. By 1750 Brazil more than doubled its
territory through the Treaty of Madrid which acknowledged the Portuguese
occupation of what is today the bulk of Brazil's territory. A number of later
treaties further expanded Brazilian territory-most of the time by their de
facto occupation of a region, rather than by any legal claims to it.21 Note
that the most recent treaties took place during the Rubber Boom Era (1880-
1920) when Brazil was particularly successful in mobilizing its population
to exploit wild rubber stands deep in the Amazon interior. Nevertheless,
Brazilians have always felt that most of their Amazonian territory was
sparsely populated and thus, their claim to it precarious. Geopolitical
thinkers within the Brazilian War College articulated a plan for not only
ensuring their sovereignty over the current territory of Brazil but which even
foresaw further expansion at the expense of Bolivia, Paraguay, and
Venezuela.23
Others who did not agree with this expansionist philosophy sought to
follow a path of mutual cooperation with their neighbors and promoted a
Treaty of Amazonian Cooperation (1978). One of its goals was to assure
Brazil's neighbors of their respect for the current boundaries, and to share
the cost of research on the resources of the region and their development.
In 14 years very few concrete results can be seen, other than high level
meetings by the Foreign Ministers. Some have diagnosed the problem as
20. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN DIMENSIONS 68-71 (Paul
C. Stem et al. eds., 1992).
21. For an illustration of the expansion of Brazil and the treaties which caused the expansion, see
Lewis A. Tambs, Geopolitics of the Amazon. in MAN IN THE AMAZON 45, 60 (Charles Wagley ed.,
1974).
22. See generally BARBARA WEINSTEIN, THE AMAZON RUBBER BoOM 1850-1920 (1983).
23. GOLBERY DO COUTO E SILVA, ASPECTOS GEOPOLUTICOS DO BRASIL (1957).
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rooted in the failure of the Amazonian countries to create an executive or
a judicial branch capable of making decisions that affect all the parties, as
is the case with the European Economic Community (EEC) and even the
Andean Pact countries.24 Data sharing has rarely occurred. Common legal
mechanisms for protecting the environment have not emerged. Some
countries have accepted debt-for-nature swaps, while others have seen them
as an infringement on their national sovereignty.
As can be expected, one of the most persistent themes in these
gatherings has been to blame the developed countries for their exploitation
of Amazonian resources, while preaching of the value of conservation to the
Amazonian countries. This is important because multinationals appear to
behave in contradiction to the actions of the states wherein they have their
corporate headquarters. Are these corporations above the law? If not, whose
law are they to abide by in terms of effluent standards, forest restoration, or
landscape restoration after mining? Should they take the "high ground" and
engage in economic processes using standards mandated in the First World,
or use the lower standards allowed, or overlooked by lax local enforcement
in Third World countries?
In recent gatherings of representatives of the various bar associations
from Latin America, a common theme was to introduce environmental law
into the curriculum of the law schools, and the formulation of laws which
have real penalties in a court of law for environmental transgressions. As
currently written, environmental laws in Latin America tend to be very
general and philosophic and difficult to enforce.
III. THE ENVIRONMENT AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE
One of the notable changes in international attitudes towards
environment is evident in Agenda 21, from the Earth Summit in Rio de
Janeiro. In that document, the rights of indigenous people to their lands was
conceded and connected to their stewardship of nature. The United Nations
General Assembly declared 1993 the International Year of the World's
Indigenous People.
Chapter 26 of Agenda 21 foresees the need to support financially and
legally the capacity of indigenous people to protect their territories from
24. A. M. Mattos, 0 Inter,sse Nacional e os Interesses Internacionais na Amazonia Brasileira,
in AMAZ6NIA: DESENVOLVIMENTO Ou RETROCESSO 126 (J. M. Monteiro da Costa ed., 1992).
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socially and environmentally unsound practices, and to use sustainably their
lands. The declarations from Agenda 21 are very general, and will need to
be specified for each place and each indigenous population. Some
indigenous people represent populations in the tens of thousands and even
hundreds of thousands, while others may have recently experienced
devastating epidemics and represent only a few hundred individuals. For
example, the Surui Indians in Rondonia experienced a loss of seventy-five
percent of their population in one decade. Their low point, reached in 1978
was 322. Since then their numbers have increased dramatically, but they are
still less than one thousand after almost twenty years of recovery from the
epidemics they experienced upon contact.2" Their capacity to engage in
disputes with the federal government, may be limited, while populations
with more substantial numbers may have teams of lawyers to assist them.
This variable capability must be taken into account as globalizing legal
procedures are considered and implemented.
Implementation of these resolutions is limited by absolute numbers,
familiarity with legal venues of action, and clear claims on given territories.
One of the most persistent sources of conflict derives from differences
between their legally-established right to exist as Indians within a multi-
ethnic state, and the actions of the Indian Protection Agency (FUNAI) which
seems to promote abandonment of indigenous modes of living. This conflict
leads to regularly occuring efforts to "privatize" Indian lands, to
"emancipate" Indian populations, and other efforts to dissolve the structural
foundations of these societies.26
Anthropologists and lawyers familiar with Brazilian legislation agreed
that the existing laws were sufficient to protect indigenous rights to land as
well as Indian ethnicity within a multi-ethnic society.2 The problem was
one of implementation. Not only were competing parties interested in
getting access to Indian lands, but the very protectors of the Indians (e.g.
FUNAI) seemed bent on betraying the very laws which existed to guarantee
the inalienable rights of indigenous peoples to communally-held lands. The
only solution seen by this gathering of anthropologists was for civil society
25. Carlos Everaldo Coimba, From Shifting Cultivation to Coffee Farming: The Impact of
Change on the Health and Ecology of the Surui Indians in the Brazilain Amazon 159 (1989)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University).
26. 0 INDIO PERANTE 0 DtErro: ENSAIOS 12 (S. Coelho Santos ed., 1982).
27. Id.
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to become increasingly educated and involved in this issue to ensure that the
multi-ethnic nature of Brazilian society was affirmed and the rights of all
were protected.
IV. CONCLUSION
The case of Brazil, and the Brazilian Amazon highlights the difficulty
in designing internationally-binding legal instruments to promote sustainable
uses of the earth's resources, and effective enforcement of regulations.
There is a movement in most countries towards a rhetorical acceptance of
environmental law, and the obligation of national law to protect the
environment. Beyond these positive tendencies, the trajectories followed by
countries in Latin America vary significantly. Colombia has seen no need
to write into their Constitution any environmental protection, and has come
out strongly against further colonization of its Amazonian territories.28 In
contrast, both Peru and Brazil take it for granted that they will continue to
promote Amazonian occupation through colonization and development
schemes and will resist efforts to stop them.29 On the other hand, both the
Peruvian and the Brazilian Constitution have affirmed the rights of all their
citizens to a healthy, stable environment. But these are constitutional
provisions disassociated from the funding required for their implementation
and can be interpreted as efforts to satisfy international pressure without
requiring any practical steps to bring them into action.
There are some positive signs at present that could spell opportunity for
change in Brazil. The economy has had one of its longest bouts with
hyperinflation in its history, and the pharaonic projects of the 1970s and
1980s may be undertaken less frequently in the 1990s. Some of these
projects are among the classic examples of environmental destruction
regularly cited in the literature. With the resignation of President Fernando
Collor de Mello under threat of corruption charges and impeachment, the
Brazilian Congress for the first time acted courageously in challenging the
presidential system. Events since that resignation failed to take advantage
of this opportunity. The plebiscite reaffirmed a strong presidency rather
than facilitated the change towards greater parliamentarism. In short,
patrimonialism prevailed over efforts to break up the bureaucratic
28. Id.
29. Id.
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authoritarian tradition.30 The cynicism and apathy of the Brazilian citizens
was broken by the mobilization of people to ensure the ousting of President
Collor. It was their mobilization which prevented the usual payoffs by the
President to ensure his staying in power through pork-barrel handouts. This
now mobilized citizenry has grown increasingly educated about the
violations of law by companies and powerful individuals, and discovered
new avenues-both legal and political-for demanding changes in how
business is transacted. Traditional ways of doing business do not change
overnight, but some of these traditional ways have been successfully
challenged for the first time.
The question before those concerned with the implementation of global
laws to protect the environment is what kind of international legal, political,
and economic actions could lead to more effective protection of the richest
realm of nature, given the fact that Brazil is sensitive to any compromise on
its sovereignty and given its aspirations at world power status, its conflicting
views towards its indigenous peoples, its patrimonial centralizing tradition
of government, and its weak capacity for implementation of policies not
supported by powerful interests? Fortunately, some sectors of Brazilian
society have no less concern than foreign observers have, and their
participation at the table to discuss ways to strengthen the responsiveness of
Brazilian Law to its own citizens' health and well-being may hold one of
the few bright hopes for a more effective linkage between law, economics,
and politics in this contested setting.
30. See generally URICOECHEA, supra note 15.
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